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ABSTRACT 
 
Team Identity and Performance-based Compensation Effects  
on Performance. (August 2008) 
Janell Leigh Blazovich, B.S., Marquette University; 
M.B.T., University of Minnesota 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Marjorie K. Shelley   
 
 This study investigates whether team members work harder and perform better 
when they are compensated based on both team and individual performance than when 
compensated based on team or individual performance alone and whether teammates‟ 
familiarity with one another influences the effectiveness of the compensation scheme.  
Four-member ad hoc student teams repeatedly complete an interdependent task on the 
computer in an experiment in which I manipulate individual compensation plan (flat 
wage or performance-based incentives), team compensation plan (flat wage or 
performance-based incentives), and teammate familiarity (identified teammates with pre-
experiment interaction – strong id or unidentified teammates with no pre-experiment 
interaction – weak id).   Results indicate that while the combination of team and 
individual performance-based compensation results in the highest performance, the 
incremental performance boost is higher from the first performance-based reward 
strategy, regardless of whether it is team or individual.  Under both strong and weak 
identity, offering a combination of individual and team performance-based 
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compensation results in comparable performance, suggesting that lower productivity 
levels associated with low team identity can be overcome with performance-based 
compensation.   Together these results suggest that, regardless of team identity, firms 
can benefit from offering both team and individual performance-based compensation.  
However, companies should understand that the performance bump may be smaller from 
the second performance-based scheme.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates whether team members work harder and perform better 
when they are compensated based on both team and individual performance than when 
compensated based on team or individual performance alone and whether teammates‟ 
familiarity with one another influences the effectiveness of the compensation scheme.  
Understanding the joint impact of team and individual performance-based compensation 
schemes on effort and performance is important because although companies often are 
advised to offer a combination of team and individual performance-based compensation 
to provide incentives for team members to work toward common goals with a minimum 
of free-riding (Gary 1997a; Gary 1997b), little is known about possible interactions 
between team and individual performance plans.
1
  Studying the simultaneous effects of 
team and individual compensation plans, in contrast to studying each in isolation, better 
matches firms‟ actual compensation policies (Ehrenberg and Milkovich 1987; DeMatteo 
et al. 1998).  
Team projects and team-based incentive plan use has increased (DeMatteo et al. 
1998; DeZoort et al. 2000; Opdyke 2004; Rynes et al. 2005; Whitehouse 2005; Stiffler 
2006), yet little empirical research examines the impact of team incentives on 
performance, either alone or in combination with individual incentive plans.  Towry 
(2003) and Rankin (2004) are exceptions and both suggest that team incentives improve 
performance.  Rankin examines the separate effects of individual and team performance-
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
 
1
 One exception being Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) which finds that adding tournament style individual 
compensation to team compensation reduces teammate cooperation. 
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based compensation, but never their combined effect.  I extend Rankin (2004) by 
exploring the joint on effort and performance effect of providing both team and 
individual performance-based compensation.   
Work team composition can vary in a number of ways – team member 
permanence (vs. ad hoc teams), team member geographic location, or team member 
functional specialization.  Some work teams are composed of colleagues who know one 
another well and are assigned to work together to accomplish a project.  Other teams are 
composed of virtual strangers working at different locations, assigned the task of jointly 
accomplishing a project.  For example, the audit teams of large multi-location companies 
often use staff from local offices, who may never meet the audit manager, to perform 
inventory counts at satellite facilities.
2
  Similarly, audit and tax teams often require 
technological support from computer staff (e.g., converting client mainframe data into a 
pc-readable format) who may never meet the other team members.
3
  Therefore, I also 
investigate whether teammate familiarity (team identity) moderates the effect of 
performance-based compensation schemes.  
Prior research finds teammate familiarity positively associated with effort and 
performance (Goodman and Leyden 1991; Gruenfeld et al. 1996; Cohen and Bailey 
1997; Wech et al. 1998; De Cremer and van Vugt 1999; De Cremer and van Dijk 2002; 
King 2002; Towry 2003).  Towry (2003) finds that when team identity is strong, within 
group monitoring systems are more effective than hierarchical monitoring systems at 
                                                 
2
 I thank Janet McDonald for this example from her work experience at Deloitte and Touche. 
3
 This example is taken from my work experience at both The Profit Recovery Group and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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inducing cooperation.  I extend Towry (2003) by investigating whether team identity 
also influences effort and performance directly and whether it influences the 
effectiveness of team or individual compensation plans.   
To eliminate task, compensation, and other incentives variation, I study my 
research question using a laboratory experiment in which I manipulate individual 
compensation plan (flat wage or performance-based incentives), team compensation plan 
(flat wage or performance-based incentives), and teammate familiarity (identified 
teammates with pre-experiment interaction – strong id or unidentified teammates with no 
pre-experiment interaction – weak id), all between subjects.4  Participants are randomly 
assigned to four-person teams, each of which loads four trucks each period, for 21 
periods.  Each teammate selects both a team and a solo effort level by choosing between 
0 and 100 effort units for each effort type.  Solo effort loads only a participant‟s own 
truck; team effort helps to load teammates‟ trucks; both effort types are costly (see 
Rankin 2004).   
Participants‟ objective is to maximize earnings, which is compensation (based on 
outcome in some conditions) less effort costs.   Achieving optimal output requires that 
all teammates provide both some solo and some team effort, making the task an 
interdependent one (Latane et al. 1979; Watson et al. 1991; Bacon et al. 1998).  Earnings 
                                                 
4
 This results in an eight cell design with the following conditions:  (1) strong id/team performance-based 
compensation/individual performance-based compensation; (2) strong id/team performance-based 
compensation/individual flat wage; (3) strong id/team flat wage/individual performance-based 
compensation; (4) strong id/team flat wage/individual flat wage; (5) weak id/team performance-based 
compensation/individual performance-based compensation; (6) weak id/team performance-based 
compensation/individual flat wage; (7) weak id/team flat wage/individual performance-based 
compensation; (8) weak id/team flat wage/individual flat wage. 
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are computed as a participant‟s allocation of team compensation, plus her individual 
compensation, less her effort cost.  Team and individual compensation is either 
performance-based or flat, depending on the experimental condition.  Like auditor bill 
rates, solo and team effort cost the same per unit, and total effort becomes increasingly 
costly with the number of effort units chosen.  The dependent measures are participants‟ 
solo and team effort choices and output. 
 Consistent with prior research, I find that performance-based compensation 
(whether team or individual) and strong team identity lead to better performance.  
Interactions between team identity and compensation plan indicate that individual 
performance-based compensation leads to higher solo effort and better performance 
regardless of team identity, but team performance-based compensation is more effective 
at motivating team effort when team identity is weak.  While the combination of team 
and individual performance-based compensation results in the highest output, the 
incremental performance boost is higher from the first performance-based reward 
strategy, regardless of whether it is team or individual.  Offering a combination of 
individual and team performance-based compensation results in essentially the same 
performance outcome, regardless of team identity, suggesting that low productivity 
levels associated with weak team identity can be overcome with joint team and 
individual performance-based compensation.   
This study extends the compensation literature by demonstrating that team and 
individual performance-based compensation jointly improve performance.  However, the 
incremental output boost from performance-based compensation is higher for the first 
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than the second plan, regardless of whether it is team or individual.  Additionally, results 
suggest that team and individual rewards, when offered together, can overcome the 
lower productivity levels associated with weak team identity.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a review 
of the relevant literature.  Section III develops the hypotheses.  Section IV describes the 
research design and task, and section V discusses the results.  Section VI concludes.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section I discuss prior literature which examines teams and performance, 
specifically the literature on team size, task, and identity.  Second, I review prior 
literature on individual compensation‟s effect on performance.  Finally, I discuss prior 
literature which examines team compensation‟s effect on performance.   
Teams and Performance 
 Team performance has been studied extensively.  Prior literature‟s consensus 
finds that team size, task, and identity affect performance.  With a few exceptions, the 
consensus is that smaller teams, three to five members, are more effective than larger 
teams.  Much of the research on team size and performance is conducted in education 
settings.  Colbeck et al. (2000) and Hilborn (1994) find that four to five students is the 
ideal size for college-level group project teams.  However, Banios (1991) finds that 
larger teams, five to eight students, work best for group projects.  When cooperative 
learning is critical, Nastasi and Clements (1991) suggest that two to five member teams 
are best.  Wolfe and Chacko (1983) find that teams of three work best when business 
games are involved.    
Two studies contradict the “smaller is better” team size rule of thumb.  Using 
company data on 72 employee involvement programs, with team sizes ranging from 8 to 
40 members, Magjuka and Baldwin (1991) find a positive association between team size 
and team effectiveness.  Their results suggest that fewer teams (with more team 
members) reduce administration costs leading to a positive relationship between team 
size and team effectiveness as measured by participants‟ and their supervisors‟ 
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perceptions of the employee involvement program‟s ability to improve departmental and 
firm effectiveness and obtain performance objectives.  Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) 
examine top management team size and firm performance.  They find that larger 
management teams are positively associated with firm performance for computer 
industry companies, but not for natural gas distribution industry companies.  They 
attribute this difference to industry environment; the computer industry is turbulent; the 
natural gas distribution industry is stable.  Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) suggest that 
larger management teams have the potential to generate more ideas, which benefits the 
rapidly changing, or turbulent environment, companies more than the stable environment 
companies.  All of the management teams they examine consist of fewer than nine 
members.   
Team work assignments create opportunities to free ride.  The Ringlemann effect 
suggests that as team size increases, people extend less effort (Latane et al. 1979).  
Ringlemann examined rope pulling and found that individuals on two-person teams 
pulled at 93% of their original effort (i.e., when pulling alone).  Individuals on teams of 
three pulled at 85% of their original effort; individuals on teams of eight pulled at 49% 
of their original effort.  A reduction in personal effort also occurs with clapping and 
cheering (Latane et al. 1979).  To reduce free riding by improving monitoring ability, 
Bacon et al. (1999) suggests limiting team size to 4 or fewer members. 
If the use of teams leads to free-riding, why do companies and classes use teams?  
When individual effort toward task completion is additive, and thus no synergies are 
gained by working in a team, the Ringlemann effect suggests the use of teams is 
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inappropriate.  However, when the task is interdependent, and synergies are gained from 
teamwork, then research has found teams of two, three, four, and five members 
outperform individuals (Bacon et al. 1998; Watson et al. 1991).   
Social identity theory suggests that people categorize themselves and others into 
groups and ultimately make decisions which favor their own groups (Tajfel and Turner 
1986).  Tajfel and Turner (1986) find that merely being classified as a group member 
induces own group favoritism, and this favoritism increases with group identity strength.  
Research finds stronger team identity results in higher contributions to the team and 
better performance (Wech et al. 1998; De Cremer and van Vugt 1999; De Cremer and 
van Dijk 2002).  Wech et al. (1998) survey 471 United States Air Force and civilian 
employees and find that team identity can explain performance variance after controlling 
for task competence.    
Using three public goods dilemma experiments, De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) 
find that team identity and cooperation are positively related and that this relationship is 
due to individuals assigning more value to the public good, and not to individuals 
trusting the cooperative nature of their teammates more, when team identity is high.  
Also using a public goods dilemma experiment, De Cremer and van Dijk (2002) find 
that strong team identity results in better cooperation, but only when participants receive 
no team performance feedback.   
Prior literature also finds that teammate familiarity is associated with better 
performance.  Goodman and Leyden (1991) find miners continuously assigned to the 
same section, job and crew mine more coal per shift than miners on crews with high 
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absenteeism.  Gruenfeld et al. (1996) also find that familiar teams outperform stranger 
teams.  Familiarity may create group cohesion which is positively associated with team 
performance (for a review see Cohen and Bailey 1997).  Companies often use unfamiliar 
teams out of convenience, since the variety of skill sets necessary for some team projects 
are not shared by all employees. 
Individual Compensation and Performance 
Individual incentive pay results in better individual performance (e.g., Chow 
1983; Sprinkle 2000; Fessler 2003; Irlenbusch and Ruchala 2008).  Chow (1983) finds 
that participants assigned to a pay plan and paid based on a piece rate for a decoding task 
outperform those paid a fixed rate and those paid for making budget.  In a second 
experiment, participants choose between a fixed and a budget-based compensation plan 
and those who choose the budget-based plan outperform those who choose the fixed 
plan.  In comparing the performance of those assigned to a fixed payment to those who 
choose a fixed rate plan, Chow (1983) finds that those who choose a fixed rate plan 
perform worse, suggesting that poor performing workers self-select into jobs that do not 
pay for performance. 
 Fessler (2003) examines individual incentive compensation and finds that task 
attractiveness and task complexity moderate the positive effect of individual incentives 
on performance.  Given a complex task that participants self-rate as attractive 
(unattractive), participants paid a fixed-wage (piece-rate) outperform those paid a piece-
rate (fixed-wage).  Fessler‟s results suggest that incentive compensation works best 
when the task is both complex and unattractive. 
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 Sprinkle (2000) finds that individual incentive pay positively affects 
performance, but only after the task is well understood.   He uses a 60 period experiment 
in which participants‟ output decisions combine with “states of nature” (i.e., 
uncontrollable aspects of productivity) to determine profit.  During the first 15 periods, 
Sprinkle (2000) finds no performance difference between those in the incentive pay 
condition and those in the flat-wage condition.  However, after the 15
th
 period incentive 
payments result in better performance.  The results of his study suggest that for tasks 
where experience matters, individual incentives may result in better performance after a 
learning period. 
Using four person teams, Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2006) examine a combination 
of team and relative individual performance-based plans and find that only substantial 
individual performance-based bonuses increase effort.  Their team task is additive and 
their individual performance-based bonus is paid only to the team‟s highest contributor. 
Team Compensation and Performance 
 Expectancy theory and agency theory predict a positive association between team 
incentives and performance (Van Eerde and Thierry 1996; Long 2005).  Vroom‟s 
expectancy theory predicts that people make choices to maximize their happiness 
(Vroom 1964).  He bases his theory on three beliefs:  (1) instrumentality, there is a 
relationship between an outcome (team performance) and another outcome (team pay); 
(2) expectancy, the expected probability of good (poor) team performance resulting in 
more (less) team incentives; and (3) valance, employees attach value to rewards (Vroom 
1964; Van Eerde and Thierry 1996).  Per agency theory, firms create contracts to reduce 
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moral hazard when the interest of principals and agents diverge.  Welbourne and Mejia 
(1995) suggest paying for team performance leads to mutual monitoring among 
teammates, thus reducing moral hazard. 
Cognitive-evaluation theory and distributive justice theory predict a negative 
association between team incentives and performance (Van Eerde and Thierry 1996; 
Long 2005).  Deci and Ryan‟s cognitive-evaluation theory suggests that paying for 
performance is negatively associated with performance in the presence of intrinsic 
motivation because extrinsic motivators (e.g., monetary incentives) decrease intrinsic 
motivation, leading to lower performance (Deci and Ryan 1985).  Distributive justice 
theory suggests that people monitor teammates by comparing the ratio of their inputs 
(such as performance) and outputs (such as rewards) to those of others, and if free-riding 
by others is detected, they increase their own free-riding to obtain equity (Bartol and 
Locke 2000).   
 While theoretical predictions vary, most of the empirical evidence supports a 
positive relationship between team incentives and performance (e.g., Fisher et al. 2003; 
Towry 2003; Rankin 2004; Roman 2006).  The exceptions include Fredrickson (1992) 
which finds that worker effort is higher under a relative performance evaluation 
compensation system than under a profit-sharing system.
 5
  He also finds that uncertainty 
moderates the effect of compensation on performance.  In his experiment, participants 
are assigned to three-person teams.  Each participant acts as a manager and his/her task 
is to make production decisions.  The task is not interdependent and does not allow 
                                                 
5
 “Relative performance evaluation is the process of comparing performances across workers.” 
(Frederickson 1992, p. 647).  
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synergies to develop among team members.  Teams are only used as comparison groups 
to provide relative performance feedback.  Fredrickson finds that as uncertainty about 
product quality increases, effort increases significantly for the relative performance 
evaluation condition participants, but not for the profit-sharing condition participants. 
Roman (2006) uses aggregate monthly (and limited aggregate weekly) 
production unit archival data from three production units at one manufacturing plant to 
examine the association between team incentives and performance.  He finds that team 
incentives are associated with higher productivity and lower product defects.  However, 
confounding events, such as administrative policy changes, also occurred around the 
time that the plant implemented its incentive plan so causality cannot be inferred from 
his results.   
 Towry (2003) finds that the effectiveness of monitoring systems depends on 
group identity.  When group identity is strong (i.e., when teammates know one another) 
horizontal, or mutual monitoring, systems are more effective than vertical systems.  A 
vertical system exists when participants report teammates‟ effort to a supervisor in stage 
two of a game.  A horizontal monitoring system exists when participants can punish 
teammates in period two of the game for performance in period one. 
 Extending Chow (1983), Fisher et al. (2003) use two person teams and a 
computerized decoding task to experimentally examine the effect of three compensation 
schemes (group piece-rate, group budget-fixed, and group budget-linear) and three 
budget levels (low, medium, and high) on group performance.  Participants in the 
budget-fixed treatment group receive a fixed amount of compensation once they meet 
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budget; participants in the budget linear treatment group receive a fixed amount of 
compensation once they meet budget, plus a piece rate for every unit above budget.  In 
Fisher et al. (2003) the group budget-linear with a medium budget level condition 
outperformed all other treatment conditions.  Fisher et al. (2003) suggest future research 
increase team size, since team size has been shown to effect cooperation, and use an 
interdependent task, since the synergistic nature of performance computations for 
interdependent tasks may also affect teammate behavior.   
Using two-person teams in a production setting, Rankin (2004) compares worker 
performance under two performance-based compensation systems (team and individual), 
two coordination environments (teams maintain the same two members for all 15-plus 
periods – high and teams switch members each period - low) and two information 
environments (team effort monitoring only and both team and solo effort monitoring).  
When workers cannot coordinate their activities (i.e., when participants play one shot 
games), Rankin finds that team-based incentives lead to better performance.  However, 
when workers can coordinate their activities (i.e., when participants play repeated games 
with the same teammate), he finds that individual incentives lead to better performance.  
Rankin suggests that under individual incentives, participants‟ behavior is similar to the 
“fully cooperative equilibrium,” while under team-based incentives participants‟ 
behavior is similar to the “partial cooperative equilibrium,” meaning teammates 
cooperate but also free ride.  Additionally, Rankin finds that when coordination is high 
(i.e., when team membership is constant) the performance difference between low and 
high information environments is greater under team-based than individual-based 
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incentives, suggesting when team incentives are used workers need more information 
about their teammates‟ behavior to induce cooperation. 
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III. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The focus of this study is the possible interaction effects on solo and team effort 
and performance of three manipulated variables - team identity, team compensation plan, 
and individual compensation plan.  My hypotheses address the predicted interactions. 
Team Identity  
Familiarity and team cohesiveness (i.e., team identity) are contextual factors that 
have been shown to affect performance and that may influence the effectiveness of team 
compensation.  Thus, I investigate whether team identity affects compensation scheme 
effectiveness. 
Social identity theory suggests that people categorize themselves and others (i.e. 
student, professor, Texan, liberal, conservative) and make decisions and judgments that 
favor their own groups; this favoritism increases with team identity strength (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986).
6
   Additionally, research finds that stronger team identification leads to 
better performance and higher contributions to the team (Wech et al. 1998; De Cremer 
and van Vugt 1999; De Cremer and van Dijk 2002).  The literature on team identity also 
finds that familiarity among team members – not necessarily the same phenomenon as 
team identity – increases performance and information sharing (Goodman and Leyden 
1991; Gruenfeld et al. 1996).
7
   
In the accounting literature, King (2002) finds that strong auditor team identity 
reduces auditors‟ tendencies to identify with clients, which reduces audit report bias (i.e., 
                                                 
6
 Tajfel and Turner (1986) find that merely being classified as a group member can induce own group 
favoritism.   
7
 In Goodman and Leyden (1991) coal miner teams with consistent membership are considered more 
familiar than teams with membership changes due to absenteeism.  In Gruenfeld et al. (1996) teams whose 
teammates have had prior (no prior) interactions are labeled familiar (stranger).  
  
16 
 
improves performance), and Towry (2003) finds that when team identity is strong, 
horizontal monitoring systems (i.e., mutual monitoring) are more effective than vertical 
monitoring systems.  Towry‟s results suggest that teams with strong identity are more 
successful when they manage themselves.  Both results suggest that teams with strong 
identity will take actions to improve team performance.  Consistent with this literature, I 
expect strong team identity to lead to more team effort and better performance. 
Performance-based Compensation 
A large body of evidence shows that incentive pay improves performance (e.g., 
Chow 1983; Sprinkle 2000; Fessler 2003), at least for individuals.  Chow (1983) finds 
that participants paid based on a piece rate for a decoding task outperform both those 
paid a fixed rate (flat wage) and those paid based on achieving a budgeted output level, 
although whether the pay plan was chosen by the worker or assigned also affects 
performance.  Fessler (2003) finds that performance-based compensation improves 
performance for inherently unattractive tasks, but not for inherently attractive tasks, and 
Sprinkle (2000) finds individual performance-based compensation improves 
performance after a learning period.  Consistent with this literature, I expect individual 
performance-based compensation to lead to more individual effort and better 
performance. 
Team performance-based compensation should motivate mutual monitoring to 
reduce free riding and improve performance (Welbourne and Mejia 1995).  However, 
distributive justice theory suggests that people monitor by comparing the ratio of their 
inputs (such as performance) and outputs (such as rewards) to those of others, and if 
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free-riding by others is detected, they increase their own free-riding to obtain equity 
(Bartol and Locke 2000).  Thus, there is room for different predictions about the 
influence of team performance-based compensation on effort and performance. 
Agency theory suggests a decrease in free-riding due to mutual monitoring, but 
distributive justice theory suggests a possible increase in free-riding that depends on how 
much free riding is detected early in a project.  However, few studies examine the effect 
of team performance-based compensation as a substitute for monitoring and those that 
do find improved performance (Fisher et al. 2003; Rankin 2004; Roman 2006).  For 
example, using archival data, Roman (2006) finds that team incentives are associated 
with higher productivity and lower product defects, but he cannot conclude with 
certainty that the association between team incentives and performance is causal because 
confounding events, such as changes in administrative policies, also occurred around the 
time the plant implemented the incentives.  My laboratory experiment allows me to 
examine the effects of performance-based compensation while holding other context 
variables constant, which allows me to make casual inferences about the effect of team 
incentives on performance.   
Fisher et al. (2003) use two member teams and a computerized decoding task to 
examine the effect of three types of performance-based compensation systems on team 
performance.  The three systems are team piece-rate, team fixed-budget, and team linear-
budget compensation schemes.  The budget-related conditions include low, medium, and 
high budget targets.  Fisher et al. (2003) find that the team linear-budget system, with a 
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medium budget target, outperforms other performance-based compensation systems.
8
  I 
extend Fisher et al. (2003) by testing the joint effect of a team performance-based 
compensation system, similar to Fisher et al.‟s team piece-rate compensation system, 
and an individual performance-based compensation. 
Rankin (2004) explores the effects of coordination environment, information 
environment, and compensation system on performance and defines compensation 
system as the method for paying participants, coordination environment as participants‟ 
ability to build reputation, and information environment as participants‟ ability to 
monitor teammates.  He operationalizes compensation system levels as either team 
output (performance-based) or individual output (performance-based), coordination 
environment levels as high (teams maintain the same two members for all 15-plus 
periods) or low (teams switch members each period), and information environment as 
team monitoring only (teammates monitor team effort only) or both team and solo 
monitoring (teammates monitor both team and solo effort).   
Rankin (2004) finds that team incentives result in better performance when team 
membership is not consistent (low coordination), regardless of monitoring ability.  
However, when teams are consistent (high coordination), monitoring ability matters.  
When coordination ability and monitoring ability are both high, a performance-based 
compensation system is not needed.  However, if coordination ability is high, but 
monitoring ability is low, individual performance-based incentives generate higher 
output than team performance-based incentives. 
                                                 
8
 Participants in Fisher et al.‟s (2003) linear-budget treatment group receive a fixed amount of 
compensation once they meet budget, and a piece-rate for every unit they decode above budget. 
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In summary, Rankin (2004) finds that participants cooperate more when offered 
individual incentives.  He attributes this to an increased need to monitor one another 
under team incentives.  When team incentives are offered, he finds that teammates 
cooperate, but they also free-ride.  I investigate the joint effect of individual and team 
performance-based compensation to determine whether the combination induces 
cooperation while reducing free-riding and I predict that the combined compensation 
schemes will work together to improve both effort and performance.  
Although prior literature shows a positive association between team identity and 
performance (Goodman and Leyden 1991; Gruenfeld et al. 1996; Cohen and Bailey 
1997; Wech et al. 1998; De Cremer and van Vugt 1999; De Cremer and van Dijk 2002; 
King 2002; Towry 2003), no prior work investigates whether and how team identity 
influences the effectiveness of either individual or team performance-based 
compensation.  I expect participants in weak team identity conditions to internalize team 
membership less, and therefore to respond more to individual performance-based 
compensation than participants in strong team identity conditions by supplying more 
solo effort.  Performance is measured as individual output, which increases with both 
solo and team effort and is optimized when all teammates exert both effort types.
9
  This 
leads to my first hypothesis, which predicts that individual performance-based 
compensation is more influential in weak than strong identity conditions.  See Figure 1. 
H1:  Individual performance-based compensation will produce a larger increase 
in individual performance (and effort) in weak than strong identity conditions. 
                                                 
9
 Optimal solo output of 103 is achieved when each teammate chooses 30 units of team effort and 20 units 
of solo effort. 
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Figure 1 shows the predicted effect on performance (and effort) of flat versus 
performance-based individual compensation.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that the 
slope of the weak team identity line is positive and steeper than the slope of the 
strong team identity line, or equivalently, that the difference between points D 
and B is larger than the difference between points C and A.  Thus, hypothesis 1 
predicts an interaction between individual compensation scheme and team 
identity. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Diagram of Hypothesis 1 
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I expect that participants in strong team identity conditions internalize team 
membership more than participants in weak identity conditions and, consequently either 
(a) respond more to team performance-based compensation than participants in weak 
team identity conditions, or (b) because they start at an elevated performance level due 
to strong team identity, respond less to team performance-based compensation than 
participants in weak identity conditions.  As a result, I expect strong team identity 
participants to either (a) supply more team effort leading to better performance or (b) 
supply similar effort leading to comparable performance.  This leads to two competing 
hypotheses, one predicting team performance-based compensation is more influential in 
strong than weak identity conditions (H2a), the second predicting team performance-
based compensation is less influential in strong than weak identity conditions (H2b).  
See Figures 2a and 2b. 
H2a:  Team performance-based compensation will produce a larger increase in 
individual performance (and effort) in strong than weak identity conditions. 
 
H2b:  Team performance-based compensation will produce a smaller increase in 
individual performance (and effort) in strong than weak identity conditions.
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FIGURE 2a 
Diagram of Hypothesis 2a 
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Figure 2a shows the predicted effect on performance (and effort) of flat versus 
performance-based team compensation.  Hypothesis 2a predicts that the slope of 
the strong team identity line is positive and steeper than the slope of the weak team 
identity line, or equivalently that the difference between points D and B is larger 
than the difference between points C and A.  Thus, hypothesis 2a predicts an 
interaction between team compensation scheme and team identity. 
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FIGURE 2b 
Diagram of Hypothesis 2b 
The Substitution Hypothesis 
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Figure 2b shows the predicted effect on performance (and effort) of flat versus 
performance-based team compensation.  Hypothesis 2b predicts that the slope of 
the strong team identity line is positive and less steep than the slope of the weak 
team identity line, or equivalently that the difference between points D and B is 
smaller than the difference between points C and A.  Thus hypothesis 2b predicts 
an interaction between team compensation scheme and team identity. 
, hypothesis 2b predicts 
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Rankin (2004) finds that offering team performance-based compensation alone 
leads to cooperation but also free-riding when monitoring ability is low.  I expect that 
team incentives encourage cooperative effort and individual incentives encourage solo 
effort and, therefore, I expect team and individual performance-based compensation to 
work together to encourage cooperation and reduce free-riding, improving both effort 
and performance.  While I expect the combined compensation schemes to produce the 
highest output, I also expect that the incremental effect of adding the additional 
compensation scheme is sub-additive since the compensation schemes are partial 
substitutes.  Thus, I expect that the biggest incremental performance gain occurs when 
one performance-based scheme is combined with a flat payment plan.  This leads to my 
third hypothesis.  See Figure 3. 
H3:  Team performance-based compensation will show a larger positive influence on 
individual performance (and effort) when individual compensation  is flat.   
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Figure 3 shows the predicted effect on performance (and effort) of flat versus 
performance-based individual compensation.  Hypothesis 3 predicts that the slope 
of the team flat line is positive and steeper than the slope of the team performance-
based line, or equivalently that the difference between points C and A is larger 
than the difference between points D and B.  Thus, hypothesis 3 predicts an 
interaction between team compensation scheme and individual compensation 
scheme. 
FIGURE 3 
Diagram of Hypothesis 3 
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I expect that team and individual performance-based compensation work together 
to reduce free-riding and improve effort and performance.  Since the team identification 
literature predicts a positive association between strong team identity and performance 
(Goodman and Leyden 1991; Gruenfeld et al. 1996; Wech et al. 1998; De Cremer and 
van Vugt 1999; De Cremer and van Dijk 2002; King 2002; Towry 2003), I predict that 
individual and team performance-based compensation will jointly improve effort and 
performance more in the strong than in the weak identity conditions resulting in a 
significant three-way interaction between the two compensation schemes and team 
identity.  This leads to my next set of hypotheses (See Figure 4).   
H4a:  In the weak team identity condition, team performance-based compensation 
improves performance (and team effort) significantly when individual compensation is 
flat, but adds nothing when individual compensation is performance-based. 
H4b:  In the strong team identity condition, team performance-based compensation 
improves performance (and team effort) by the same amount whether individual 
compensation is flat or performance-based.  
  
2
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Panel A: When Team Identity is Weak 
 
 
Panel A shows the predicted effect on performance (and team effort) of 
team and individual performance-based compensation when team 
identity is weak.  Hypothesis 4a predicts that the slope of the flat team 
line is positive and steeper than the slope of the performance-based 
team line, or equivalently that the difference between points C and A is 
larger than the difference between points D and B.  Taken together, 
H4a and H4b predict a three-way interaction among individual 
compensation, team compensation, and team identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: When Team Identity is Strong 
 
 
 
Panel B shows the predicted effect on performance (and team effort) of 
team and individual performance-based compensation when team 
identity is strong.  Hypothesis 4b predicts that the slopes of the flat and 
performance-based compensation lines are positive and do not differ 
significantly, or equivalently that the difference between points C and 
A is similar to the difference between points D and B.  Taken together, 
H4a and H4b predict a three-way interaction among individual 
compensation, team compensation, and team identity. 
FIGURE 4 
Diagram of Hypothesis 4 
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IV. RESEARCH METHOD 
Participants are 96 undergraduate students from a large southwestern university.  
My experimental task does not require expert knowledge or skills, so students are 
appropriate participants (Peecher and Solomon 2001).  All participants are currently 
enrolled in an accounting class and earn extra course credit ranging from 0.5 - 2.5% on 
their final grade for participating.
10
  Additionally, two lottery winners in each session 
receive $40 making the average monetary payout per participant $5.00.
11
  Twelve 
participants are randomly assigned to each of eight conditions (8 x 12 = 96).
 12
  
Experiment sessions last approximately 90 minutes and take place outside of regular 
class time in the computer lab.  Table 1 shows demographic data.   
Design  
I manipulate team and individual compensation plans, and team identity in a 2 × 
2 × 2 between-subjects design.  The task is completed in 18 periods resulting in repeated 
within-subject responses.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Participation points differed by professor.  Participants knew only their own extra credit amount. 
11
 Experiment sessions were run with 16 participants per session ($40 + $40 = $80 / 16 participants = 
average payout of $5 per participant).   
12
 Two outlier individuals and their teammates were dropped from the data.  To obtain a balanced design 
one group was randomly chosen and dropped from each additional condition.  This results in three groups 
or 12 participants per condition.     
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TABLE 1 
Demographic Data 
 
 Number   Percent  
     
Total Participants 96  100.0  
     
Participants' year in school:
1
     
     Freshman 4  4.2  
     Sophomore 7  7.3  
     Junior 71  74.0  
     Senior 13  13.5  
     No Response 1  1.0  
     
Participants' gender:
2
     
     Male 47  49.0  
     Female 48  50.0  
     No Response 1  1.0  
     
 Mean Median (S.D.)  
     
Average prior courses with team work:
3
 6.46 5 (6.663)  classes 
Average self-assessed risk:
4
 3.687 4 (3.132)  
 
1Data come from 95 responses to the following exit survey question: “Please indicate your year in school 
(freshman, sophomore, etc.).”  One participant did not respond to this question.  Based on ANOVA testing, 
response means are not significantly different across treatment conditions (F = 1.006, p = 0.433).  
2
Data come from 95 responses to this exit survey question: “Please indicate whether you are male or female 
(Check one).”  One participant did not respond to this question.  Based on ANOVA testing, response means 
are not significantly different across treatment conditions (F = 1.879, p = 0.083). 
3
Data come from 95 responses to this exit survey question: “Please indicate how many courses you have 
taken previously which included group work (include courses you are taking this semester).”  One 
participant did not respond to this question.  Based on ANOVA testing, response means are not significantly 
different across treatment conditions (F = 0.872, p = 0.532).   
4
Data come from 94 responses to this exit survey question: “If given the choice between the following, 
which would you choose (circle one per line):  $400 or 40% chance for $1,000,…, $8,000 or 80% chance for 
$10,000.”  Two participants did not respond to this question.  Participants‟ risk choices (their second 
options) are summed and that summary number is used for analysis.  The summary values ranges from 0 – 
14, with 0 (14) indicating a person is risk neutral (seeking).  Based on ANOVA testing, at least one response 
mean is different across treatment conditions (F = 2.501, p = 0.022).  Post-hoc analysis identified the Team 
Flat/Individual Flat/Weak identity condition‟s mean is less than that of the Team Flat/Individual 
Performance-Based/Strong identity condition.   
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Manipulated variables.  Team and individual compensation are manipulated as 
fixed compensation (flat team wage or flat individual wage) or compensation computed 
as a function of either team or individual output (performance-based team compensation 
or performance-based individual compensation).  Following Towry (2003), I use team 
member introductions, unique paper colors, and team competitions to create strong 
group identity (See also Eckel and Grossman 2005; Shelley and Zhao 2007).  I use team 
member anonymity, white paper, and individual competitions to create weak group 
identity.  The top team earns (the top four individuals earn) carnival prizes for team 
(individual) puzzle and quiz competitions. 
Dependent measures.  Responses are the two effort choices.  Dependent variables 
in statistical analyses are effort choices and individual output (i.e., performance).
13
  A 
participant‟s solo output is computed using his/her solo effort and his/her teammates‟ 
team effort.  Team output is the sum of all teammates‟ solo outputs.  Optimal solo output 
of 103 is achieved when each teammate expends team effort of 30 and solo effort of 
20.
14
 
                                                 
13
 Since team output is merely the sum of teammates‟ solo outputs, it is not analyzed. 
14
 The computation of solo output follows Rankin (2004) modified for four people.  The optimal effort 
choices and optimal solo output would change if the formula changed.    
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Expressions (1) through (8) below show how individual and team output and 
compensation are computed for the truck loading task.  Teams are assumed to have four 
identical agents, i, j, k, and l (Rankin 2004).  Agent i‟s solo output per period, Mi, is a 
function of both agent i’s effort, eii, toward his individual output and his teammates‟ 
efforts, eji, eki, eli, toward team output.
 15
   
  Mi = eii + 3(eii
0.25
eji
0.25
eki
0.25
eli
0.25 
)
                     
(1) 
Expression (1) adjusts Rankin (2004) for the increase in team size by changing the effort 
exponents from .5 to .25.  Rankin used exponents of 0.5 because he had two-person 
teams (1 ÷ 2 = 0.5).  I use exponents of 0.25 because I have four-person teams (1 ÷ 4 = 
0.25).  Rankin included the multiplier of 3 to create greater disparity between his optimal 
solo and team effort choices, purposefully creating an environment in which similar 
effort units for both effort types was not optimal.   
Total team output per period, T in expression (2), is the sum of all agents‟ solo 
outputs.  
  T = Mi + Mj + Mk + Ml          (2) 
The cost of effort (CEi) for agent i, expression (3), is the same as Rankin‟s (2004) cost of 
effort function.   
  CEi = (eii + eij)
2
/50,       (3) 
Effort becomes more costly per unit as it increases and total (solo and team) effort 
choices over 50 units are not rational because the cost exceeds the benefit.  Solo and 
                                                 
15
 Solo and  team output functions are identical to those used by Rankin (2004) except that I do not 
incorporate a random variable to mask teammate effort choices because my team size masks teammate 
effort choices. 
 
  
32 
team effort costs are equal and therefore, based on effort costs alone, agents should be 
indifferent between solo and team effort.  The cost of effort (expression (3)) is subtracted 
from total compensation to arrive at net compensation. 
 Total compensation for agent i, Ci, is computed as the agent‟s proportionate share 
of team compensation plus his/her individual compensation.  Flat compensation is, of 
course, not based on output.  Team performance-based compensation is a function of 
team output; individual performance-based compensation is structured as a bonus and 
earned when solo output equals or exceeds the average (across all individuals in the 
session and all periods to date) solo output (Bi).  Total compensation computations are 
shown below by experimental condition:  
(A)   Flat Team/Flat Individual Compensation  
  Ci = 100 + 50        (4) 
(B)   Flat Team/Performance-based Individual Compensation  
Ci = 100 + [100× 50% × Bi],      (5) 
where: 
Bi  equals 1 when individual i’s output equals or exceeds the  
average output of all other agents to date, and 0 otherwise. Bi  
triggers i‟s bonus.  
 
 
(C)  Performance-based Team/Flat Individual Compensation 
 Ci = [ ¼ (Mi + Mj + Mk + Ml)] + 50,      (6) 
where: 
  Mn (n = i, j, k, l) is expression (1). 
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(D)   Performance-based Team/Performance-based Individual Compensation  
 Ci = [ ¼ (Mi + Mj + Mk + Ml)] + [( ¼ (Mi + Mj + Mk + Ml)) × 50% × Bi], (7) 
where: 
Bi  equals 1 when individual i’s output equals or exceeds the  
average output of all other agents to date, and 0 otherwise,  
Bi triggers i‟s bonus. Mn (n = i, j, k, l) is expression (1). 
 
  
An individual‟s net compensation,  , is computed by subtracting cost of effort from 
total compensation: 
 (Ci, CEi) = Ci – CEi,                (8) 
where 
  Ci is expression (4), (5), (6), or (7) depending on the experimental  
  condition, and CEi  is expression (3). 
 
 
Task.   I use the truck loading task from Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Rankin 
(2004), in which two people working together load one truck faster than two people 
working in parallel load one truck.  The truck loading task has evolved, resulting in 
recent experiments not using the truck loading context within the materials.  My 
experiment is no different; participants receive no references to truck loading during my 
experiment.  Rankin (2004) modified the task by constructing a two-person/two-truck 
task in which each person makes two effort choices:  (1) effort toward loading his/her 
own truck, and (2) effort toward helping his/her teammate load his/her truck.  I further 
modify the truck loading task by creating a four person/four truck production 
environment in which participants make two effort choices:  (1) effort toward loading 
his/her own truck (solo effort), and (2) effort toward helping his/her teammates load 
34 
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their trucks (team effort).
16
  Participants choose their solo and team effort levels by 
selecting two integers from 0 to 100.    Solo effort represents effort toward solo output 
and team effort represents effort toward team output.  Using a computer program 
participants make effort choices for each of 21 periods (see Appendix A for screen prints 
of the computer game created using z-Tree; Fischbacher 2007).  The first three periods 
are practice or pre-production periods and output from these periods is not included in 
compensation calculations.  Total net compensation from the remaining 18 production 
periods is converted into lottery tickets.
17
 
Procedure.  Participants arrive at the computer lab, sit in randomly assigned 
seats, and read an overview of the experiment.  See Appendix B.  Next participants sign 
their consent forms and complete the first of two identity-manipulation tasks.  Next the 
experiment administrator publicly reads the instructions, administers a quiz over the 
instructions, and awards quiz prizes.
18
  The instructions and quiz are available in 
Appendices C and D, respectively.  Once identity-manipulation prizes are distributed, 
participants begin the experimental task of making a series of two effort choices (solo 
and team effort) in each of 21 periods.  Next, participants answer manipulation check 
and demographic questions on the exit survey, see Appendix E.   Finally, participants are 
paid, thanked and dismissed. 
                                                 
16
 Participants‟ team effort helps all other teammates load their trucks.   
17
 To avoid end game strategies participants are not told the total number of production periods.   
18
 I run only one condition per session.   
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V. RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
The exit survey asks participants to respond to a series of 26 questions that 
include manipulation checks for individual compensation, team compensation, and team 
identity manipulations.  The individual compensation manipulation check question reads 
“My qualifying for solo compensation depended on my solo output (indicate the degree 
to which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale]).”  Responses were significantly 
different across individual compensation conditions, indicating that participants 
understood their own individual compensation condition, individual flat or individual 
performance-based compensation (t = 8.716, p = 0.000).  Thus, I conclude that the 
individual compensation manipulation was effective.  Results from the team 
compensation manipulation check question, which read “My team compensation 
depended on my team‟s output (indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree [on an 
11-point scale]),” indicate that participants also understood their own team compensation 
condition, flat or team performance-based compensation (t = 11.648, p = 0.000).  Thus, I 
conclude that the team compensation manipulation was effective.   
Nearly all participants (99.0%) knew whether their teammates were or were not 
identified to them (“I could point to the people on my team (circle one): True False”).19  
Participants in the strong identity condition felt closer to their teammates than 
                                                 
19
 The percentage of participants responding correctly (based on their condition) did not vary statistically 
among conditions. 
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participants in the weak identity condition (t = 6.805, p = 0.000), indicating that the team 
identity manipulation was effective.
20
   
Exit survey results also indicate that participants understood the impact of their 
effort choices on output and found neither the experiment scoring nor the computer 
portion of the experiment too complicated.
 21, 22
  On average, participants felt well 
compensated for their time, confident about their effort choices, and tried to earn lottery 
tickets.
23
 
                                                 
20
 I use an 11-point five–item identity scale adapted from Shelley and Zhao (2007).  Using factor analysis I 
create one measure of team identity.  Reliability is confirmed with a Chronbach‟s alpha of 0.702.    
21
 Responses to six exit survey questions (two multiple choice questions and four Likert scale response 
questions) support that participants understand the impact their effort choices have on output.  The two 
multiple choice questions (a) “My solo output was affected by…” and (b) “My team output was affected 
by….” are answered correctly by 96% and 91% of the participants respectively.  However, the team output 
question (b) is answered correctly by weak identity condition participants 98% of the time and strong 
identity participants 83% of the time.  Participant mean responses to four additional questions which asked 
participants to “indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale, with one labeled 
„strongly disagree‟ and 11 labeled „strongly agree‟]” are all higher statistically than the midpoint response 
of 6.  The questions were as follows:  (a) “I understood the impact of my effort choices on my solo 
output”(mean = 7.36, sd = 2.735), (b) “I understood the impact of my effort choices on my team output” 
(mean = 6.63, sd = 2.784), (c) “I understood the impact of my teammates‟ effort choices on my solo 
output” (mean = 6.8146, sd = 2.872), and (d) “I understood the impact of my teammates‟ effort choices on 
my team output” (mean = 6.87, sd = 2.70).  Participant responses do not vary statistically across 
conditions with the exception of the strong identity condition.  Their mean responses are neither higher nor 
lower than the midpoint of 6, which is labeled “Agree” on the Likert scale.    
22
 The experiment scoring question reads as follows: “The scoring used in this experiment was too 
complicated (indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale, with one labeled 
„strongly disagree‟ and 11 labeled „strongly agree‟])” (mean = 5.31, sd = 2.788).  Participants mean 
response is statistically lower than the midpoint response option of 6 (t = 2.416, p = 0.018) with the 
exception of the team performance-based compensation condition (mean = 5.98, sd = 2.638) which is not 
statistically different from the midpoint of 6 (t = 0.055, p = 0.957).  The computer complexity question 
reads as follows: “The computer portion of this experiment was easy to understand (indicate the degree to 
which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale, with one labeled „strongly disagree‟ and 11 labeled 
„strongly agree‟])” (mean = 8.05, sd = 2.641).  Participants mean response is statistically above the 
midpoint response option of 6 (t = 7.612, p = 0.000).  Participant responses do not vary statistically 
between conditions. 
23
 The compensation question reads as follows: “I felt well compensated for my time (indicate the degree 
to which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale, with one labeled „strongly disagree‟ and 11 labeled 
„strongly agree”])” (mean = 6.60, sd = 2.540).  Participants mean response is statistically higher than the 
midpoint response option of 6 (t = 2.311, p = 0.023).  The confidence question reads as follows: “I was 
confident about my effort choices (indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale, 
with one labeled „strongly disagree‟ and 11 labeled „strongly agree‟])” (mean = 6.90, sd = 2.594).  
Participants mean response is statistically higher than the midpoint response option of 6 (t = 3.387, p = 
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Descriptive Results 
Table 2 (Panels A, B, and C) provides descriptive statistics for participants‟ 
average output, average solo effort, and average team effort per period respectively.  
Regardless of team identity, the greatest output results from the combination of team and 
individual performance-based compensation (Table 2, Panel A).  However, participants‟ 
effort is not always highest when both performance-based compensation schemes are in 
use.
24
  When team identity is weak, the highest solo effort stems from a combination of 
team and individual performance-based compensation, but when team identity is strong, 
the highest solo effort results from individual performance-based compensation alone 
(Table 2, Panel B).  The highest team effort arises when both team and individual 
performance-based compensation are offered, when team identity is strong (Table 2, 
Panel C).  However, when team identity is weak, team effort does not improve when 
individual performance-based compensation is added to team incentives (Table 2, Panel 
C).  Participants‟ effort and output varies more when team identity is strong (i.e., higher 
standard deviation).   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
0.001).  The attempt to earn lottery tickets question reads as follows: “I attempted to maximize my points / 
lottery tickets (indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree [on an 11-point scale, with one labeled 
„strongly disagree‟ and 11 labeled „strongly agree‟])” (mean  = 9.74, sd = 1.808).  Participants mean 
response is statistically higher than the midpoint response option of 6 (t = 20.263, p = 0.000).  For these 
three questions, participant responses do not vary statistically between conditions. 
24
 Output is created from a participant‟s solo effort and his teammates‟ team effort choices, and effort 
levels closest to optimal result in the best performance. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition 
 
 
Panel A: Output 
a
    
 Mean
b 
   
 (Standard Deviation)   
 Sample Size   
                      Team Identity - Weak 
   Individual Compensation 
   Flat Performance-based    
Team Compensation    
Flat   6.8687  37.6408  
   (10.0314) (15.2667) 
 n=12  n=12  
      
Performance-based   61.8313  75.3064  
   (17.0472) (20.9398) 
 n=12  n=12  
   
                      Team Identity - Strong 
   Individual Compensation 
   Flat Performance-based    
Team Compensation    
Flat   27.3223  68.1815 
   (20.8722) (22.0650) 
 n=12  n=12  
      
Performance-based   77.2052 81.8053 
   (27.6363) (22.1583) 
 n=12  n=12  
  
 
aTable 2, Panel A represents 96 student participants individual output in a computerized experimental game where I 
manipulate Team Compensation (flat, performance-based), Individual Compensation (flat, performance-based), and 
Team Identity (weak, strong) between subjects. 
bMean is the mean of between subjects mean of the 96 participants' 18 within subjects means by condition.  For 
example, Participant A's total participant output is earned over 18 periods, therefore participant A's mean output is 
his/her total output divided by 18.  Participant A's mean output is summed with the mean outputs of the other 11 
participants in his/her condition and then divided by 12 (the total number of participants per condition) to arrive at the 
table mean above.   
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TABLE 2 
 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Solo Effort
c
    
 Mean
d
    
 (Standard Deviation)   
 Sample Size   
                      Team Identity - Weak 
   Individual Compensation 
   Flat Performance-based    
Team Compensation    
Flat   4.8102  28.7454  
   (9.5015) (12.9941) 
 n=12  n=12  
      
Performance-based   20.3426  39.7222  
   (5.6516) (16.4297) 
 n=12  n=12  
   
                      Team Identity - Strong 
   Individual Compensation 
   Flat Performance-based    
Team Compensation    
Flat   8.1991  40.0833 
   (7.2625) (17.1394) 
 n=12  n=12  
      
Performance-based   24.9398 27.5093 
   (16.2313) (13.7255) 
 n=12  n=12  
  
 
cTable 2, Panel B represents 96 student participants solo effort choices in a computerized experimental game where I 
manipulate Team Compensation (flat, performance-based), Individual Compensation (flat, performance-based), and 
Team Identity (weak, strong) between subjects. 
dMean is the mean of between subjects mean of the 96 participants' 18 within subjects means by condition.  For 
example, Participant A's total solo effort is extended over 18 periods, therefore participant A's mean solo effort is 
his/her total solo effort divided by 18.  Participant A's mean solo effort is summed with the mean solo effort choices of 
the other 11 participants in his/her condition and then divided by 12 (the total number of participants per condition) to 
arrive at the table mean above.   
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TABLE 2 
 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Team Effort
e
     
 Mean
f
    
 (Standard Deviation)   
 Sample Size   
                      Team Identity - Weak 
   Individual Compensation 
   Flat Performance-based    
Team Compensation    
Flat   4.2083  4.1667  
   (6.3981) (4.2035) 
 n=12  n=12  
      
Performance-based   17.5833  16.7500  
   (7.1510) (12.2784) 
 n=12  n=12  
   
                      Team Identity - Strong 
   Individual Compensation 
   Flat Performance-based    
Team Compensation    
Flat   10.5787  10.4352 
   (10.4385) (7.2461) 
 n=12  n=12  
      
Performance-based   22.2639 26.8194 
   (20.3173) (13.7902) 
 n=12  n=12  
  
 
eTable 2, Panel C represents 96 student participants team effort in a computerized experimental game where I 
manipulate Team Compensation (flat, performance-based), Individual Compensation (flat, performance-based), and 
Team Identity (weak, strong) between subjects. 
fMean is the mean of between subjects mean of the 96 participants' 18 within subjects means by condition.  For 
example, Participant A's total team effort is extended over 18 periods, therefore participant A's mean team effort is 
his/her total team effort divided by 18.  Participant A's mean team effort is summed with the mean team effort choices 
of the other 11 participants in his/her condition and then divided by 12 (the total number of participants per condition) 
to arrive at the table mean above.   
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 Replication Tests 
 
 To confirm prior research, I examine the relationships between the manipulated 
variables (team identity, individual compensation, and team compensation) and 
performance and expect to find positive relationships between each.  Table 3 presents 
ANOVA results by dependent variable.  Consistent with prior literature, which shows 
performance-based compensation positively affects effort and performance, the results 
confirm that team performance-based compensation (Team) positively affects output (F 
= 90.288, p = 0.000), solo effort (F = 8.307, p = 0.005), and team effort (F = 34.176, p = 
.000).  Also consistent with prior performance-based compensation literature, the results 
show that individual performance-based compensation (Indiv) positively affects output 
(F = 29.804, p = 0.000) and solo effort (F = 53.390, p = 0.000).  However, no 
relationship is found between individual performance-based compensation and team 
effort (F = 0.146, p = 0.703). 
Team identity ANOVA results are also consistent with prior research which 
suggests that stronger team identity results in more effort and better performance.  Team 
identity (ID) positively affects output (F = 19.665, p = 0.000) and team effort (F = 8.783, 
p = 0.004).  Results indicate no relationship between team identity (ID) and solo effort 
(F = 0.446, p = 0.506).   
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TABLE 3 
Results from Three ANOVAs with Repeated Measures
a
 
 
 Output   Solo Effort   Team Effort 
Source F-statistic (df) p-value   F-statistic (df) p-value   F-statistic (df) p-value 
Intercept 704.565 (1, 88) 0.000  333.447 (1, 88) 0.000  148.986 (1, 88) 0.000 
Team 90.288 (1, 88) 0.000  8.307 (1, 88) 0.005  34.176 (1, 88) 0.000 
Indiv 29.804 (1, 88) 0.000  53.390 (1, 88) 0.000  0.146 (1, 88) 0.703 
ID 19.665 (1, 88) 0.000  0.446 (1, 88) 0.506  8.783 (1, 88) 0.004 
Team × Indiv 10.623 (1, 88) 0.002  10.127 (1, 88) 0.002  0.179 (1, 88) 0.673 
Team  × ID 3.141 (1, 88) 0.080  4.407 (1, 88) 0.039  0.052 (1, 88) 0.820 
Indiv  ×  ID 0.005 (1, 88) 0.941  0.693 (1, 88) 0.407  0.327 (1, 88) 0.569 
Team  × Indiv  ×  ID 1.332 (1, 88) 0.252   5.412 (1, 88) 0.022   0.353 (1, 88) 0.554 
            
Where:  
Output = individual output, or Mi, as computed by equation (1). 
Team = Team equals 1 when team compensation is performance-based and 0 when team compensation is flat. 
Indiv = Indiv equals 1 when individual compensation is performance-based and 0 when individual compensation is flat. 
ID = ID equals 1 when the team identity condition is strong and 0 when the team identity condition is weak. 
 
Degrees of Freedom: 
The total number of participants equals 96.  Therefore degrees of freedom listed above are 88. 
 
Replication Test Results 
Team performance-based compensation (Team) positively affects output, solo effort, and team effort. 
Individual performance-based compensation (Indiv) positively affects output and solo effort. 
Strong team identity (ID) positively affects output and team effort. 
 
Hypothesis Test Results 
H1:  Results indicate that individual compensation and team identity have no interactive effect on output or effort. 
H2a & H2b:  Results indicate that team compensation and team identity have an interactive effect on output and solo effort.  Results support H2b.       
H3:  Results indicate that team and individual compensation do have an interactive effect on output and solo effort. 
H4a & H4b:  Results indicate no three-way interaction exists among team compensation, individual compensation, and team identity.   
 
a All models are analyzed using repeated measures GLM in SPSS 15.0.
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Hypotheses Tests 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that individual performance-based compensation will show 
a larger positive influence on performance in weak than in strong identity conditions.  
ANOVA results indicate an insignificant interaction between individual performance-
based compensation (Indiv) and team identity (ID) (F = 0.005, p = 0.941), Table 3.  
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction obtained.  These results suggest that while individual 
performance-based compensation raises performance, it does so equally under the weak 
and strong identity conditions.  Thus, the data do not support Hypothesis 1.  The 
interactions between team identity and individual performance-based compensation on 
solo effort and team effort are also insignificant (F = 0.693, p = 0.407 and F = 0.327, p = 
0.569, respectively).  
Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b are competing hypotheses with hypothesis 2a 
(2b) predicting that team performance-based compensation will show a larger (smaller) 
positive influence on performance in strong than in weak identity conditions.  ANOVA 
results indicate a marginally significant interaction between team performance-based 
compensation (Team) and team identity (ID) (F = 3.414, p = 0.080), Table 3.  Figure 6 
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FIGURE 5 
Interaction Effect between Individual Compensation 
and Team Identity on Estimated Mean Individual Output: 
Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates that individual compensation and team 
identity have no interactive effect on performance. 
 
  
Performance 
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illustrates the interaction obtained.  The results suggest that team performance-based 
compensation has a larger positive influence on output in the weak than the strong 
identity condition, as predicted in H2b.  Thus, the data support the H2b.  As illustrated in 
Figure 6, when team identity is strong, the difference between flat team compensation 
and performance-based team compensation is less than the same difference when team 
identity is weak suggesting that team performance-based compensation improves 
performance less when team identity is strong.  The interaction between team identity 
and team compensation on solo effort is significant (F = 4.407, p = 0.039), but the same 
interaction on team effort is not significant (F = 0.052, p = 0.820).  The results suggest 
that performance-based team compensation improves solo effort more when team 
identity is weak, but team compensation and team identity have no interactive effect on 
team effort. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that output improves more when team performance-based 
compensation is added to individual flat compensation than when it is added to 
individual performance-based compensation.  Results indicate a significant interaction  
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FIGURE 6 
Interaction Effect between Team Compensation and  
Team Identity on Estimated Mean Individual Output: 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates that the interaction of team compensation and team identity 
on performance supports H2b, not H2a.   
 
Performance 
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between team compensation (Team) and individual compensation (Indiv) for output (F =  
10.623, p = 0.0002), Table 3.  Figure 7 illustrates the interaction.  When individual 
compensation is flat, adding team performance-based compensation significantly 
improves output, but when individual compensation is performance-based, adding team 
performance-based compensation improves output to a smaller extent.  The interaction  
effect of team and individual compensation on solo effort is significant (F = 10.127, p = 
0.002), and suggests that when individual compensation is flat, adding team 
performance-based compensation significantly improves solo effort, but when individual 
compensation is performance-based, adding team performance-based compensation does 
not improve solo effort.  The same interaction‟s effect on team effort is insignificant (F = 
0.179, p = 0.673), meaning, while team performance-based compensation improves team 
effort, there is no interaction effect between the compensation systems.   
Hypothesis 4a predicts that when team identity is weak and individual 
compensation is flat, team performance-based compensation improves performance 
significantly, it but adds nothing when individual compensation is performance-based.  
However, Figure 8, Panel A shows that when team identity is weak, adding team 
performance-based compensation improves performance significantly regardless of the 
individual compensation scheme.  Therefore the data do not support H4a.  Specifically, 
Figure 8, Panel A shows that adding team performance-based compensation improves 
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FIGURE 7 
Interaction Effect between Team Compensation and  
Individual Compensation on Estimated Mean Individual Output: 
Hypothesis 3 
 
 
 
The above figure illustrates that team compensation and individual compensation have 
an interactive effect on performance. 
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performance when individual compensation is flat more than it improves performance 
when individual compensation is performance-based. 
Hypothesis 4b predicts that when team identity is strong, team performance-
based compensation improves performance about the same amount regardless of the 
individual compensation scheme.  Figure 8, Panel B shows that adding team 
performance-based compensation to flat individual compensation vastly improves 
performance, while adding team performance-based compensation to individual 
performance-based compensation improves performance less.  Therefore the data do not 
support H4b. 
Together, hypotheses 4a and 4b predict a three-way interaction among team 
performance-based compensation, individual performance-based compensation, and 
team identity, suggesting that the effectiveness of combining compensation schemes 
depends on the familiarity of team members.  Although graphical depictions suggest a 
three-way interaction, ANOVA results do not support the prediction.  The three-way 
interaction is not significant (F = 1.332, p = 0.252) and neither hypothesis 4a nor 4b is 
supported, Table 3.  The three-way interaction among team identity, team compensation, 
and individual compensation is significant for solo effort (F = 5.412, p = 0.022), but not 
for team effort (F = 0.353, p = 0.554). 
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Consistent with prior literature showing that strong team identity positively 
affects effort and performance, my results confirm that strong team identity participants 
are more productive than otherwise equal weak team identity participants when team 
compensation is flat (Figure 8).  Contrast results indicate no statistically significant 
difference between the productivity of participants in the weak identity/ team 
performance-based/individual performance-based condition and those in the strong 
identity /team performance-based/individual performance-based condition (p = 0.588) 
(see Figure 8, item 1).  This result suggests that weak team identity can be overcome by 
offering a combination of team and individual performance-based compensation. 
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FIGURE 8 
Interaction between Individual and Team Compensation on Estimated Mean Individual Output 
by Team Identity: Hypothesis 4a and 4b
 
Panel A.  Graph of Results when Team Identity is Weak 
 
 
The above figure illustrates the interaction of team and 
individual compensation on performance when team 
identity is weak. 
 
 
 
Panel B.  Graph of Results when Team Identity is Strong 
 
 
The above figure illustrates the interaction of team and 
individual compensation on performance when team 
identity is strong.
Performance Performance 
Item 1 
Contrast 
P = 0.588 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study tests how combinations of individual compensation, team 
compensation, and team identity affect the effort and performance of individuals 
working in teams.  Consistent with prior literature the results confirm that, on their own, 
team performance-based compensation, individual performance-based compensation, 
and strong team identity all positively affect performance. 
 Results indicate that individual performance-based compensation leads to higher 
solo effort and better performance, regardless of team identity.  However, results also 
indicate that team performance-based compensation is more effective at motivating team 
effort and performance when team identity is weak (i.e. when teammates do not know 
one another).  The combination of team and individual performance-based compensation 
results in the highest output.  However, the incremental performance boost is higher 
from the first performance-based reward strategy, regardless of whether it is team or 
individual.  Under both strong and weak team identity, offering both individual and team 
performance-based compensation results in comparable performance, which suggests 
that lower productivity predicted for weak team identity may be overcome with a 
combination of team and individual performance-based compensation regardless of 
teammate familiarity. 
 Examining the effect of both team and individual performance-based 
compensation extends the literature by measuring the joint effect of the two 
compensation schemes on performance.  The results suggest that regardless of how 
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closely teammates work with one another, a combination of team and individual 
performance-based compensation results in the best performance. 
The results of this study are subject to several limitations.  First, the data 
represent effort decisions and performance outcomes from an experimental game created 
to resemble one interdependent production environment, which limits the 
generalizability of the results.  I chose to test my hypotheses using a game because it 
allowed me to manipulate only the variables of interest – team compensation, individual 
compensation, and team identity, while holding other factors (i.e., task and 
compensation variation) constant.  Extensions of this project might examine additional 
production environments to confirm the results.  Optimal output in this production 
environment is achieved with higher team effort than solo effort.  Results may be weaker 
if optimal output is achieved with higher solo than team effort.  Future non-experimental 
projects might also examine different levels of performance-based compensation to 
determine at what point performance-based compensation no longer results in better 
performance. 
Second, participants were compensated with lottery tickets and only two tickets 
per session were randomly chosen for cash prizes of $40.  Non-lottery-winners were not 
compensated monetarily, although they did receive extra course credit.  Research on the 
necessity of paying subjects is mixed but in experimental economics, research 
participants are generally paid based on their performance (Davis and Holt 1993; 
Friedman and Sunder 1994; Jenkins et al. 1998; Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Bonner and 
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Sprinkle 2002).  Finally, this experiment examined four person ad hoc teams.  The 
results may not generalize to teams of different sizes or to permanent teams. 
Solo effort, team effort, and performance are affected by the combination of 
compensation schemes.  My results suggest that regardless of how well teammates know 
one another, firms can benefit from offering both team and individual performance-
based compensation.  However, companies should understand that the performance 
bump may be smaller from the second performance-based scheme. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPERIMENT GAME SCREEN PRINTS 
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Decision Making Screen  
 
This is the 3
rd
 production period‟s decision making screen.  A participant makes his/her 
effort decisions on the left and his/her prior period decisions are listed on the right.  Non-
positive numbered periods (-2, -1, and 0) are pre-production periods.    
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Recap and Compensation Screen 
 
This is the 3
rd
 production period‟s recap and compensation screen.  A participant views 
this screen after he/she has made his/her 3
rd
 period effort decisions.  The participant‟s 
effort decisions are recapped on the top left and his/her compensation calculations are 
given on the bottom left.  His/her prior period decisions are listed on the right.  Non-
positive numbered periods (-2, -1, and 0) are pre-production periods.  The experimental 
condition shown above is team performance-based compensation and individual 
performance-based compensation.  This participant did not qualify for solo 
compensation this period. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS - OVERVIEW 
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Overview 
[Strong Team ID Condition] 
 
This is an experiment in individual team members‟ decision making.  At the end of 
today‟s session, points will be converted into lottery tickets, 10 points = 1 lottery ticket.  
 
There will be two lottery drawings at the end of this session.  In each lottery drawing 
one ticket will be randomly selected to win a cash prize of $40.  Therefore, in this 
session a total of $80 will be distributed.  An individual may win only one lottery, not 
both.   
 
During this experiment you will be part of a team.  Your team will be the group of 4 
individuals who are seated with you.  Your teammates will remain the same for the 
duration of the experiment. 
 
In this experiment, your task will be to make two effort choices (pick two numbers).  
These effort choices will be referred to as solo effort and team effort.  It will be 
explained in detail how these effort choices will affect both your solo output and your 
team output.  Also we will discuss the solo, team, and net compensation which are 
computed in points.  In addition, we will work through examples and complete a quiz to 
ensure that everyone understands how to calculate both output and compensation 
(points) before the actual decision periods begin.  Actual decision periods will take place 
on the computer.   
 
On the computer, you will make effort decisions in 3 practice periods (labeled periods -
2, -1, and 0) followed by many experiment periods.  The exact number of experiment 
periods will be randomly determined.  Different experiment sessions may play for a 
different number of periods.   
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Overview 
[Weak Team ID Condition] 
 
This is an experiment in individual team members‟ decision making.  At the end of 
today‟s session, points will be converted into lottery tickets, 10 points = 1 lottery ticket.  
 
There will be two lottery drawings at the end of this session.  In each lottery drawing 
one ticket will be randomly selected to win a cash prize of $40.  Therefore, in this 
session a total of $80 will be distributed.  An individual may win only one lottery, not 
both.   
 
During this experiment you will be part of a team of 4.  Your teammates are seated 
randomly around the room.  Your teammates will remain the same for the duration of the 
experiment.   
 
In this experiment, your task will be to make two effort choices (pick two numbers).  
These effort choices will be referred to as solo effort and team effort.  It will be 
explained in detail how these effort choices will affect both your solo output and your 
team output.  Also we will discuss the solo, team, and net compensation which are 
computed in points.  In addition, we will work through examples and complete a quiz to 
ensure that everyone understands how to calculate both output and compensation 
(points) before the actual decision periods begin.  Actual decision periods will take place 
on the computer.   
 
On the computer, you will make effort decisions in 3 practice periods (labeled periods -
2, -1, and 0) followed by many experiment periods.  The exact number of experiment 
periods will be randomly determined.  Different experiment sessions may play for a 
different number of periods.   
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APPENDIX C 
 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS - INSTRUCTIONS 
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Instructions  
[Strong Team ID / Individual Flat Compensation / Team Flat Compensation Condition] 
 
 
As you recall, you have been randomly assigned to a team of four.  Your teammates are 
the individuals who are sitting with you.  You will remain a member of this team of four 
for the remainder of the experiment even when we begin working on the computers.     
 
Effort Choices & Cost of Effort 
At the beginning of each decision period each participant will choose two effort choices 
(pick two numbers).  Each effort choice must be an integer from 0 to 100.  Choices will 
be made on the computer and the screen where the data is entered will look similar to:   
 
 
 
After you have made your solo effort and team effort choices for a period, you will press 
the OK button.   
 
Associated with the sum of the effort choices is an effort cost.  Note from the effort cost 
table that the higher the sum of the effort choices, the greater the associated cost.  All 
participants have identical costs associated with their effort choices. 
 
You will never know your teammates‟ effort choices and your teammates will never 
know your effort choices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Solo Effort    
Team Effort 
OK 
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Solo Output & Solo Compensation  
 
Solo Output =  Your solo effort +  
   [3 x (Your solo effort
.25
) x 
   (Teammate2’s team effort.25) x 
   (Teammate3’s team effort .25) x 
   (Teammate4’s team effort.25)]  
  
Your solo output depends on your solo effort and your teammates‟ team 
effort choices. 
  
  
            
       
 
 
Each period you will be told the average solo output of all players to date.   
 
 Solo Compensation is set at 50 points per person per period.   
 
                                                      
                                                                        = 
 
 
 
Team Output & Team Compensation  
 
Team Output = Sum of ALL teammates Solo Outputs  
 
 
 
 
 
Team output takes into account all teammates‟ effort choices (both solo 
and team).   
  
Team Compensation is set at 400 points per team per period.  Your allocation 
or portion of team compensation will be ¼.   
 
 
                                                                                     =
My Solo Effort & 
My Teammates’ Team Effort 
My Solo Output 
My Solo Compensation 50 points per person  
per period 
My Team Output My Solo Output + 
My Teammates’ Solo Outputs 
My Team Compensation 
400 points per team  
per period 
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Net Compensation 
Your net compensation (in points) will be computed each period as follows: 
 Your allocation of team compensation 
 Plus  any solo compensation 
 Less  your cost of effort 
 
 
Lottery 
At the end of today‟s session, points will be converted into lottery tickets, 10 points = 1 
lottery ticket.   
 
There will be two lottery drawings at the end of this session.  In each lottery drawing 
one ticket will be randomly selected to win a cash prize of $40.  Therefore, in this 
session a total of $80 will be distributed.  An individual may win only one lottery, not 
both.   
 
 
How many periods will I play? 
On the computer, you will make effort decisions in 3 practice periods (labeled periods -
2, -1, and 0) followed by many experiment periods.  The exact number of experiment 
periods will be randomly determined.  Different experiment sessions may play for a 
different number of periods.   
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Example 1: 
Your solo effort = 25 
Your team effort = 20 
 
Your teammates‟ solo efforts = 20, 25, and 30 
Your teammates‟ team efforts = 10, 15, and 20 
 
 Recall: Solo Output =  Your Solo Effort +  
   [3 x (Your Solo Effort
.25
) x 
   (Teammate2’s Team Effort.25) x 
   (Teammate3’s Team Effort .25) x 
   (Teammate4’s Team Effort.25)]  
 
Team Output = Sum of ALL teammates Solo Outputs  
 
 
Therefore, your solo output = 25 + [3(25
.25
)(10
.25
) (15
.25
) (20
.25
)] = 74.65 
 
 DON’T WORRY – the computer will do all the computations for you!!! 
I want you to UNDERSTAND how it works – not actually do the computations 
yourself 
 
And, your team’s output (assuming your teammates‟ solo outputs = 75.84, 78.35, and 
81.96)  =  74.65 + 75.84 + 78.35 + 81.96 = 310.80 
 
 
Team Compensation = 400 points 
Your allocation of Team compensation = 400 / 4 or 100 
 
Your net compensation would be: 
 
 Your allocation of Team Compensation:     100.00   
 Plus: Solo Compensation         50.00 
 Less: Your Cost of Effort   40.50 
Resulting in: Your Net Compensation           109.50  
 
This is a portion of the effort cost sheet.  All participants cost sheets are the same.   
 
  
Total - Solo and 
Team Effort Cost
42 35.28
43 36.98
44 38.72
45 40.50
46 42.32
47 44.18  
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Example 2: 
Your solo effort = 30 
Your team effort = 25 
 
Your teammates‟ solo efforts = 20, 25, and 30 
Your teammates‟ team efforts = 10, 15, and 20 
 
 Recall: Solo Output =  Your Solo Effort +  
   [3 x (Your Solo Effort
.25
) x 
   (Teammate2’s Team Effort.25) x 
   (Teammate3’s Team Effort .25) x 
   (Teammate4’s Team Effort.25)]  
 
Team Output = Sum of ALL teammates Solo Outputs  
 
Therefore your solo output = 30 + [3(30
.25
)(10
.25
) (15
25
) (20
.25
)] = 81.96 
 
And, your team’s output (assuming your teammates‟ Solo outputs = 79.04, 81.41, and 
84.94)  =  81.96 + 79.04 + 81.41 + 84.94 = 327.35 
 
Team Compensation = 400 points 
Your allocation of Team compensation = 400 / 4 or 100   
 
Your net compensation would be: 
 
 Your allocation of Team Compensation: 100.00 
 Plus: Solo Compensation     50.00 
 Less: Your Cost of Effort     60.50 
Resulting in: Your Net Compensation    89.50  
 
  Lottery Tickets earned this period       8.95   (89.50 / 10) 
 
This is a portion of the effort cost sheet.  All participants cost sheets are the same.   
 
  
Total - Solo and 
Team Effort Cost
50 50.00
51 52.02
52 54.08
53 56.18
54 58.32
55 60.50
56 62.72
57 64.98
58 67.28  
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Instructions 
[Weak Team ID / Individual Performance-based Compensation / Team Performance-
based Compensation Condition] 
 
 
As you recall, you have been randomly assigned to a team of four.  Your teammates are 
seated randomly around the room.  You will remain a member of this team of four for 
the remainder of the experiment even when we begin working on the computers. 
 
Effort Choices & Cost of Effort 
At the beginning of each decision period each participant will choose two effort choices 
(pick two numbers).  Each effort choice must be an integer from 0 to 100.  Choices will 
be made on the computer and the screen where the data is entered will look similar to:   
 
 
 
After you have made your solo effort and team effort choices for a period, you will press 
the OK button.   
 
Associated with the sum of the effort choices is an effort cost.  Note from the effort cost 
table that the higher the sum of the effort choices, the greater the associated cost.  All 
participants have identical costs associated with their effort choices. 
 
You will never know your teammates‟ effort choices and your teammates will never 
know your effort choices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Solo Effort    
Team Effort 
OK 
73 
 
 
Solo Output & Solo Compensation 
 
Solo output =  Your solo effort +  
   [3 x (Your solo effort
.25
) x 
   (Teammate2’s team effort.25) x 
   (Teammate3’s team effort .25) x 
   (Teammate4’s team effort.25)]  
  
Your solo output depends on your solo effort choice and your teammates‟ 
team effort choices. 
 
  
            
       
 
 
Your qualification for solo compensation will be based on your solo output.  
You will earn solo compensation each period your solo output exceeds the 
average solo output of all players to date.  When you qualify for solo 
compensation, your solo compensation will be equal to 50% of your allocation of 
team compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team Output & Team Compensation 
 
Team Output = Sum of ALL teammates Solo Outputs  
 
 
 
 
 
Team output takes into account all teammates‟ effort choices (both solo 
and team).   
 
Team Compensation will be based on team output.  Your team will earn points 
for team output, 1 output = 1 point.  Since you are part of a team of four, your 
allocation or portion of team compensation will be ¼.   
 
 
My Solo Effort & 
My Teammates’ Team Effort 
My Solo Output 
My Solo Output Qualifies me for  
Solo Compensation 
My Team Output My Solo Output + 
My Teammates’ Solo Outputs 
My Team Output My Team Compensation 
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Net Compensation 
Your net compensation (in points) will be computed each period as follows: 
 Your allocation of team compensation 
 Plus  any solo compensation 
 Less  your cost of effort 
 
 
Lottery 
At the end of today‟s session, points will be converted into lottery tickets, 10 points = 1 
lottery ticket.   
 
There will be two lottery drawings at the end of this session.  In each lottery drawing 
one ticket will be randomly selected to win a cash prize of $40.  Therefore, in this 
session a total of $80 will be distributed.  An individual may win only one lottery, not 
both.   
 
 
How many periods will I play? 
On the computer, you will make effort decisions in 3 practice periods (labeled periods -
2, -1, and 0) followed by many experiment periods.  The exact number of experiment 
periods will be randomly determined.  Different experiment sessions may play for a 
different number of periods.   
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Example 1: 
Your solo effort = 25 
Your team effort = 20 
 
Your teammates‟ solo efforts = 20, 25, and 30 
Your teammates‟ team efforts = 10, 15, and 20 
 
 Recall: Solo Output =  Your Solo Effort +  
   [3 x (Your Solo Effort
.25
) x 
   (Teammate2’s Team Effort.25) x 
   (Teammate3’s Team Effort .25) x 
   (Teammate4’s Team Effort.25)]  
 
Team Output = Sum of ALL teammates Solo Outputs  
 
 
Therefore, your solo output = 25 + [3(25
.25
)(10
.25
) (15
.25
) (20
.25
)] = 74.65 
 
 DON’T WORRY – the computer will do all the computations for you!!! 
I want you to UNDERSTAND how it works – not actually do the computations 
yourself 
 
And, your team’s output (assuming your teammates‟ solo outputs = 75.84, 78.35, and 
81.96)  =  74.65 + 75.84 + 78.35 + 81.96 = 310.80 
 
 
Team Compensation = 310.80 points 
Your allocation of Team compensation = 310.80 / 4 or 77.70 
 
Assuming you did not qualify for Solo compensation, your net compensation would be: 
 
 Your allocation of Team Compensation: 77.70 
 Plus: Solo Compensation                0 
 Less: Your Cost of Effort   40.50 
Resulting in: Your Net Compensation  37.20  
 
This is a portion of the effort cost sheet.  All participants cost sheets are the same.   
 
  
Total - Solo and 
Team Effort Cost
42 35.28
43 36.98
44 38.72
45 40.50
46 42.32
47 44.18  
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 Example 2: 
Your solo effort = 30 
Your team effort = 25 
 
Your teammates‟ solo efforts = 20, 25, and 30 
Your teammates‟ team efforts = 10, 15, and 20 
 
 Recall: Solo Output =  Your Solo Effort +  
   [3 x (Your Solo Effort
.25
) x 
   (Teammate2’s Team Effort.25) x 
   (Teammate3’s Team Effort .25) x 
   (Teammate4’s Team Effort.25)]  
 
Team Output = Sum of ALL teammates Solo Outputs  
 
Therefore your solo output = 30 + [3(30
.25
)(10
.25
) (15
25
) (20
.25
)] = 81.96 
 
And, your team’s output (assuming your teammates‟ Solo outputs = 79.04, 81.41, and 
84.94)  =  81.96 + 79.04 + 81.41 + 84.94 = 327.35 
 
Team Compensation = 327.35 points 
Your allocation of Team compensation = 327.35 / 4 or 81.84   
 
Assuming you did qualify for Solo compensation, your net compensation would be: 
 
 Your allocation of Team Compensation: 81.84 
 Plus: Solo Compensation   40.92 
 Less: Your Cost of Effort   60.50 
Resulting in: Your Net Compensation  62.26  
 
  Lottery Tickets earned this period     6.23   (62.26 / 10) 
 
This is a portion of the effort cost sheet.  All participants cost sheets are the same.   
 
  
Total - Solo and 
Team Effort Cost
50 50.00
51 52.02
52 54.08
53 56.18
54 58.32
55 60.50
56 62.72
57 64.98
58 67.28  
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APPENDIX D  
 
EXPERIMENT QUIZ 
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Quiz Questions  
[Strong Team ID Condition] / (Weak Team ID Condition) 
 
[Team Name] / (Name):  __________________________ 
 
 
1. My solo output will be affected by: 
a. My solo effort 
b. My team effort 
c. My teammates‟ solo effort choices 
d. My teammates‟ team effort choices 
e. A & D 
f. B & C 
g. All of the above 
 
 
2. My team output will be affected by: 
a. My solo effort 
b. My team effort 
c. My teammates‟ solo effort choices 
d. My teammates‟ team effort choices 
e. A & D 
f. B & C 
g. All of the above 
 
3. My team compensation (in points) will: 
a. Equal team output 
b. Equal my solo output 
c. Always equal 400 points 
 
 
4. My allocation of Team Compensation equals: 
a. 100% of team compensation 
b. 50% of team compensation 
c. 25% of team compensation 
d. 10% of team compensation 
 
 
5. I will qualify for solo compensation: 
a. Every period regardless of my solo output 
b. Every period in which my solo output exceeds the average output to date 
c. Every period in which my solo output exceeds the average output for that 
period 
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6. [Assuming you did qualify for solo compensation, then solo compensation 
equals: ]   
(Solo compensation equals: )   
a. 10% of your allocation of team compensation 
b. 50% of your allocation of team compensation 
c. 10 points 
d. 50 points 
 
 
7. The number of lottery tickets I will receive will be affected by: 
a. My allocation of team compensation plus any solo compensation received 
less my cost of effort 
b. My allocation of team compensation less my cost of effort 
c. My allocation of team compensation plus any solo compensation received 
d. Regardless of allocation, compensation, and cost of effort I will receive 
five lottery tickets per period 
 
 
 
Problem 1 (use the following information for questions 8 and 9): 
 
Your solo effort = 35 
Your team effort = 17 
 
Your teammates‟ solo effort choices = 30, 25, and 20 
Your teammates‟ team effort choices = 15, 22, and 27 
 
 
8. Your solo output =  
a. 35 + [3(35.25)(30.25) (2525) (20.25)]  
b. 35 + [3(35.25)(15.25) (2225) (27.25)]  
c. 17 + [3(17.25)(30.25) (2525) (20.25)] 
d. 17 + [3(17.25)(15.25) (2225) (27.25)] 
 
9. Your team output equals:  
a. The sum of your solo output and your teammates‟ solo outputs 
b. The sum of your teammates‟ solo outputs 
c. Your solo output x 4 
d. None of the above  
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Problem 2 (use the following information for question 10): 
 
Your solo effort = 25 
Your team effort = 35 
 
Your teammates‟ solo effort choices = 30, 25, and 20 
Your teammates‟ team effort choices = 15, 22, and 27 
 
 
10. Your output =  
e. 35 + [3(35.25)(30.25) (2525) (20.25)]  
f. 35 + [3(35.25)(15.25) (2225) (27.25)]  
g. 25 + [3(25.25)(30.25) (2525) (20.25)] 
h. 25 + [3(25.25)(15.25) (2225) (27.25)] 
 
 
Problem 3: (use the following information for questions 11 and 12)::   
 
Your team‟s total compensation = 400 
Your solo effort = 20 
Your team effort =10 
 
11. What is the cost associated with your total effort?  Refer to the attached decision 
cost sheet. 
a. 2 
b. 8 
c. 18 
d. 30 
 
12. [Assume you did qualify for solo compensation.  Your net compensation (in 
points) equals: ] 
(Your net compensation (in points) equals: ) 
a. 400 + 50 – 18 
b. 400 + 50 – 30 
c. 400/4 + 50 – 18 
d. 400/4 + 50 – 30 
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT EXIT SURVEY 
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Exit Survey 
[All Conditions] 
 
1. My team consisted of how many people (including you)? 
a. 2 
b. 3 
c. 4 
d. 5 
 
 
2. I could point to the people on my team (circle one): True       False 
 
 
3. My solo output was affected by: 
a. My solo effort 
b. My team effort 
c. My teammates‟ solo effort choices 
d. My teammates‟ team effort choices  
e. A & D 
f. B & C 
g. All of the above 
 
 
4. My qualifying for solo compensation depended on my solo output (Indicate the degree to which 
you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
5. My team output was affected by: 
a. My solo effort 
b. My team effort 
c. My teammates‟ solo effort choices 
d. My teammates‟ team effort choices  
e. A & D 
f. B & C 
g. All of the above 
 
 
6. My team compensation depended on my team‟s output (Indicate the degree to which you 
agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
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7. My NET compensation was in the form of: 
a. Dollars which converted into lottery tickets 
b. Francs which converted into lottery tickets 
c. Points which converted into lottery tickets 
d. Euros which converted into lottery tickets 
 
 
 
8. I identified with my teammates (Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
9. I was pleased to be a member of my team (Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
10. I wanted my team to succeed during the experiment (Indicate the degree to which you 
agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
 
11. It bothered me to think that my team might not generate as much output as a result of effort 
choices (Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
 
12. I was not overly concerned if my team did not generate much output because of my effort choices 
(Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
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13. I attempted to maximize my points / lottery tickets (Indicate the degree to which you 
agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
14. I felt well compensated for my time (Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
15. I was confident about my effort choices (Indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
16. The scoring used in this experiment was too complicated (Indicate the degree to which you 
agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
17. The computer portion of this experiment was easy to understand (Indicate the degree to which 
you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
18. I understood the impact of my effort choices on my solo output (Indicate the degree to which you 
agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
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19. I understood the impact of my effort choices on my team output (Indicate the degree to which 
you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
20. I understood the impact of my teammates‟ effort choices on my solo output (Indicate the degree 
to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
 
21. I understood the impact of my teammates‟ effort choices on my team output (Indicate the degree 
to which you agree/disagree) 
Strongly Disagree                   Agree            Strongly Agree 
    
1 2  3   4   5    6     7     8      9     10      11 
                  |_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________|_________| 
 
 
 
22. Please indicate your year in school (freshman, sophomore, etc.) ______________ 
 
 
23. Please indicate your major (accounting, finance, marketing, etc.) 
_________________________________ 
 
24. Please indicate how many courses you have taken previously which include group work (include 
courses you are taking this semester) _______ 
 
 
25. Please indicate whether you are male or female. (Check one)   
Male____  Female____ 
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26. If given a choice between the following, which would you choose (circle one per line): 
 
$400            or  40% chance for $1,000 
 
$300           or  30% chance for $1,000 
 
$200           or  20% chance for $1,000 
 
$500          or  50% chance for $1,000 
 
$600          or  60% chance for $1,000 
 
$700      or  70% chance for $1,000 
 
$800      or  80% chance for $1,000 
 
$4,000    or  40% chance for $10,000 
 
$3,000   or  30% chance for $10,000 
 
$2,000   or  20% chance for $10,000 
 
$5,000   or  50% chance for $10,000 
 
$6,000   or  60% chance for $10,000 
 
$7,000   or  70% chance for $10,000 
 
$8,000   or  80% chance for $10,000 
 
 
Please confirm that for Question #26 you have circled one choice PER LINE. 
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Thank you for participating! 
 
 
I really appreciate you taking the time to help me with this project! 
 
 
 
 
  
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